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In	the	middle	of	Freedom’s	Laboratory,	Audra	Wolfe	describes	a	moment	of	archival	
revelation.	Presented	with	the	catalogue	of	the	immense	archive	of	the	CIA-
supported	Asia	Foundation,	she	found	herself	scrolling	through	a	list	of	‘every	
conceivable	category	of	nonprofit	organization,	from	the	Brookings	Institution	to	the	
Girl	Scouts	.	.	.	wondering	whether	every	single	US	voluntary	group	doing	work	
abroad	was	not,	in	fact,	doing	the	CIA’s	bidding.’	Covert	operations	on	this	scale,	she	
observes,	‘fertilized	the	already	rich	soil	from	which	a	thousand	conspiracy	theories	
bloomed.’	(162).	
	 This	readable	and	thought-provoking	work	arises	from	Wolfe’s	earlier	study,	
Competing	with	the	Soviets	(2013).	This	provided	an	expert	overview	of	the	role	of	
American	‘big	science’	in	the	cold	war	–	and	not	only	big	science	but	also	but	also	the	
anti-Marxist	‘big	economics’	of	global	industrial	‘take-off’,	the	‘big	society’	
programmes	of	the	1960s,	and	the	‘big	space’	of	the	Apollo	project,	America’s	largest	
peacetime	domestic	public	works	programme.	That	book	ended	with	the	radical-led	
backlash	of	the	late	1960s	against	Eisenhower’s	‘military-industrial	complex’.	
	 Freedom’s	Laboratory	digs	more	deeply	into	the	role	of	the	US	in	using	science	
simultaneously	to	advance	both	state	power	and	anti-communist	values	under	the	
banner	of	scientific	freedom.	This	was	an	operation	so	pervasive	that	most	of	those	
involved	it	barely	even	acknowledged	what	was	going	on.	At	the	core	of	the	book	is	
Wolfe’s	recognition	that	‘support	for	scientific	freedom	was	not	oppositional	at	all’.	
By	failing	to	recognise	the	indivisible	hand	of	the	state	here,	‘historians	of	science	
have	greatly	misread	the	uses	of	apolitical	science	in	the	cold	war’	(13).		
	 The	abuses	of	Lysenkoism	and	‘Soviet	science’	under	Stalin	made	the	initial	
identification	of	scientific	freedom	and	American	values	easy.	By	the	same	token,	the	
ideological	need	to	avoid	Soviet-style	state-promoted	science	programmes	required	
an	arm’s-length	approach	–	hence	the	creation	in	1950	of	the	National	Science	
Foundation	when	it	was	finally	created	in	1950	as	the	biggest	civil	funder	of	science.	
When	the	NSC68	directive	identified	the	global	battle	for	hearts	and	minds	as	‘a	real	
war’,	the	State	Department	came	up	with	a	scheme	of	‘science	attachés’.	Scientists	
were	posted	in	US	embassies	to	foster	friendly	relations	with	their	overseas	
counterparts,	were	unaware	of	their	intelligence	role	until	(or	even	after)	they	were	
gently	pumped	for	information	on	their	return	home.	Ironically	the	science	attaché	
scheme	had	to	be	abandoned	when	it	was	denounced	by	McCarthyite	republicans	for	
bringing	communist-affiliated	scientists	into	the	US.		
	 As	scientific	diplomacy	became	too	hot	a	potato	for	the	State	Department	it	
became	the	province	of	the	CIA,	whose	covert	operations	specialists	worked	not	so	
much	at	arm’s	length	as	at	tentacle’s	length.	An	early	success	was	the	highly	public	
operation	to	discredit	the	Soviet-sponsored	1949	‘Peace	Conference’	in	New	York.	
The	Congress	for	Cultural	Freedom	was	inaugurated	the	next	year	with	a	huge	
conference	in	post-airlift	Berlin,	with	the	whole-hearted	support	of	such	
independent-minded	figures	as	Alfred	Ayre,	Arthur	Koestler,	Vladimir	Nabokov,	and	
Eugene	Rabinowicz,	a	leading	figure	in	the	atomic	scientists’	movement.		In	a	
revelatory	chapter	on	the	Pugwash	conferences,	Wolfe	shows	how	Rabinowicz,	often	
taken	to	be	a	dissident	figure,	was	in	fact	wholly	behind	the	government’s	use	of	
these	events	for	back-channel	diplomacy.	His	ideologically	committed,	anti-
communist	brand	of	scientific	internationalism	led	him	to	oppose	moves	by	the	more	
politically	aware	members	led	by	Linus	Pauling	to	take	up	Soviet	proposals	for	test	
bans	and	nuclear	disarmament,	causing	a	split	in	the	atomic	scientists	movement	
between	diplomats	and	activists	who	otherwise	appeared	to	share	the	same	values.	
‘Scientific	neutrality’,	concludes	Wolfe,	‘remained	a	key	value	of	US	cultural	
diplomacy	through	most	of	the	cold	war’	(134),	but	ideologically	neutral	it	was	not.		
	 This	is	one	of	several	chapters	which	are	also	valuable	as	essays	and	student	
readings.	Chapter	5	deals	with	Eisenhower’s	embarrassingly	successful	‘Atoms	for	
Peace’	campaign	in	the	mid	1950s	(which	was	unable	to	deliver	on	its	basic	swords-
into-plowshares	promise)	and	the	more	militarily-focused	International	Geophysical	
Year	of	1957-8,	marred	for	the	US	by	the	success	of	Sputnik	which	the	Soviets	offered	
as	their	contribution.	Chapter	7	looks	at	the	Asia	Foundation,	an	exercise	in	
international	science	education	pitched	as	‘Asian	programming	for	asiatics’,	while	
chapter	8	looks	at	the	exposure	of	covert	CIA	cultural	funding	in	1967,	symbolised	by	
the	row	over	support	for	the	influential	magazine	Encounter.	Liberal	beneficiaries	
such	as	Michael	Polanyi	and	Eugene	Rabinowicz	were	in	denial,	insisting	on	their	
own	independence,	but	the	cultural	critic	Chrisopher	Lasch	wrote	cuttingly	that	‘the	
freedom	of	the	American	intellectuals	as	a	professional	class	blinds	them	to	their	
own	unfreedom’	(172).		
	 A	final	chapter,	‘Scientists’	Rights	are	Human	Rights’,	deals	with	the	decade	or	
so	after	the	Helsinki	Accords	of	1975	when	the	USSR	ostensibly	accepted	western	
principles	of	human	rights.	The	challenge	to	the	Soviet	refusal	to	apply	these	
principles	to	its	own	citizens	was	led	by	scientists	such	as	Sakharov,	Bonner,	Kovalev,	
and	Scharansky.	The	limitations	of	supposedly	apolitical	science	diplomacy	emerged	
as	the	dissidents	denounced	excessively	tactful	foreign	delegations	which	connived	
with	the	Soviet	smokescreen.	A	decade	later,	these	same	dissident	scientists	were	
significant	players	in	the	endgame	of	the	cold	war.	‘In	this	small	but	important	way,’	
writes	Wolfe,	‘cultural	diplomacy	involving	science	contributed	to	the	eventual	
downfall	of	the	Soviet	Union’	(195).		
	 In	a	sharp	and	combative	epilogue	(another	useful	reading	in	science	studies)	
Wolfe	makes	clear	her	own	stance.	The	critical	disciplines	of	‘science	studies’	and	
‘science	policy	studies’	emerged	as	a	necessary	response	to	the	use	of	an	
ideologically-loaded	rhetoric	of	scientific	freedom	as	cover	for	the	power	politics	of	
the	cold	war.	She	admits	that	the	mockery	of	woolly-minded	postmodernist	naivety	
by	the	Sokal	hoax,	and	the	ruinous	assault	on	science	by	the	climate	change	denialism	
of	Bush	and	Trump,	have	damaged	the	cultural	critique	of	science.	Nonetheless,	she	
insists,	scientists	cannot	and	should	not	evade	making	hard	political	choices;	they	
should	avoid	‘advancing	systems	of	state	power’	and	instead	encompass	‘freedom	
and	justice	for	all’.		
	 Freedom’s	Laboratory	is	an	important	work	which	powerfully	combines	
international	relations	and	science	and	technology	studies	to	demonstrate	the	
importance	of	scientific	diplomacy	in	the	cold	war.	Its	archival	revelations	are	
complemented	by	interviews	with	surviving	figures	from	the	period;	indeed,	Steven	
Rose	contributed	his	own	memoir-laced	review	in	the	London	Review	of	Books	(18	
July	2019).	In	its	interdisciplinary	fluency	it	sits	alongside	other	studies	of	scientific	
culture	of	the	cold	war,	such	as	McNeill	and	Unger’s	Environmental	Histories	of	the	
Cold	War	(2010),	Launius	et.	al.’s	Globalizing	Polar	Science	(2010),	Hamblin’s	Arming	
Mother	Nature	(2013),	and	Mandler’s	Return	from	the	Natives:	how	Margaret	Mead	
Won	the	War	and	Lost	the	Cold	War	(2013).	As	the	climate	continues	to	heat	up,	the	
history	of	diplomacy	and	the	history	of	science	become	ever	more	inseparable.	
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